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NIETZSCHE ON ENVY 
GARY SHAPIRO 
A recent newspaper story suggests a significant change in the attitude of 
some baseball fans. While the phenomenon of harassment of players from the 
stands is not new, there seems to be a new spirit behind the hurling of bottles 
and other dangerous debris. Whereas such attacks were once motivated by 
scorn for poor performance or by a violent enthusiasm for the opposing team, 
spectators are now also apparently moved by envy. They are, according to a 
number of sportswriters, jealous and resentful of the high salaries and prestige 
of professional ballplayers. No doubt envy is an ancient phenomenon, but it is 
not one much discussed in recent moral philosophy. Both the neglect and the 
signs that it is becoming an increasingly large problem of personal and social life 
(I'll later be adding more to what might be taken to be the merely idiosyncratic 
behavior of sports fans) suggest the need for an analysis of its motives, dynamics 
and possible antidotes. Nietzsche seems to be one of the few modern thinkers 
who have devoted much attention to envy after the scholastics' �ttempt at an 
encyclopedic and systematic account of the virtues and vices .I Nietzsche's con­
cern with the subject is much more pervasive than is suggested by the scanty 
references to Neid and its derivatives in Schlechta's index; moreover, his analysis 
must be distinguished from the treatment of the allied concept of ressentiment 
which has generated much attention. (For example, envy is discussed at least 
fourteen times in Human, All-Too-Human, appropriately enough.)2 
It is necessary to distinguish envy from some similar attitudes with which it 
is often confused. To describe envy as a disturbance or distress caused by the 
good fortune of another would not be sufficiently precise. One might be 
disturbed at another's success and so propelled into an attempt to emulate or 
surpass the other's achievement, as a young runner might set as a standard for 
himself the records of a champion. This is the distinction, familiar to Aristotle, 
between envy and emulation or ambition. Envy must also be distinguished 
from jealousy. The jealous person resents the achievement of another because 
he believes that he deserves (or equally deserves) the reward or recognition in 
question. I am jealous of you for having obtained a job for which I believe that I 
have equal or better qualifications or I am jealous that you have received more 
applause than I when my performance in the play was equally good.J Envy ex­
ists when I simply resent your good fortune, your achievement or your recogni­
tion as such, without any thought that it is properly mine or that I might, with 
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effon, become worthy of the same. This is the emotion which is close to Nietz· 
sche's ressentiment; it is a strictly re-active attitude which finds another's good as 
such to be despicable or disgusting. In John Rawls's formulation, to which 
N�etzsche
. 
':ould subscribe, "we may think of envy as the propensity to view 
wtth hosnhty the greater good of others even though their being more for· 
tunate than we are does not detract from our advantages."4 
In order to understand what Nietzsche thinks about envy or, for that mat· 
t�r •
. 
about any other significant topic it is necessary to see how the concept is ex· �tbtted and dramatized in his writings. For Nietzsche philosophical analysis is 
mseparable from the structure, style, and rhetorical context of what is said. I 
think we can make a first approach to the concept of envy by examining a 
chapter from Thus Spoke Zaratbustra, the most obviously narrative, dramatic and 
rhetorical of his writings. In the first part there is a section called "Of the Tree 
on the Mountainside" which may appear somewhat puzzling until it is realized 
that envy is the crucial notion around which this particular slice of the drama 
revolves. The form of the chapter is that of a parable or metaphor in which 
Zarathustra uses the tree as a way of understanding the condition of an envious 
youth. As Zarathustra says later, "Whenever your spirit wants to speak in 
parables or metaphors (Gleicbnisse) pay heed, for that is when your virtue has its 
origin and beginning."5 
The chapter begins with Zarathustra's noticing that a young man has been 
avoiding him. This is rather unusual behavior even in the somewhat unclear 
social
. 
world which we surmise in this book. Zarathustra has disciples and 
enemtes here; he has those who would give him advice (the prophet and the old 
woman who makes the notorious remark about the whip); and no doubt there 
are those who are indifferent to him. Why should anyone deliberately avoid 
Zarathustra? Zarathustra himself throws some light on this question in his first 
sp�ech. The situation of that speech is that by wandering through the moun­
tams, he has come across the young man in question leaning against a tree and 
gazing wearily into the valley. Grasping the tree Zarathustra begins his parable: 
"If I wanted to shake this tree with my hands I should be unable to do it. 
"But the wind, which we cannot see, torments it and bends it where it wishes. It is invisi· 
ble hands that torment and bend us the worst. "• 
The tree is moved by that which is not visible or tangible. Like natural motion, 
social and psychological motion (emotion) need not be a response to pushes and 
pulls which are obviously and grossly present. Envy is a paradigmatic case of 
such emotional action at a distance. Whereas Jove, hate, and friendship presup· 
pose some more or less regular contact with the one for whom the emotion is 
felt, en�y may thrive on absence. It is quite possible to envy those with whom I 
have little contact, because they are celebrated for their wealth, their 
achievements or their power. (Of course I may also envy those with whom I 
associat� more directly.) There is something disturbing about the presence of 
the envted person and so the envier may seek to avoid a presence which would 
� 
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remind him of his distress at not having the thing that he lacks or at not being 
the person who he is not. Nevenheless the imagined superiority of the envied 
person will "torment and bend us the worst" for imagination will dwell on and 
exaggerate the properties of the envied figure. Envy can become self· 
reinforcing, for his reluctance to confront the actual figure will lead the envious 
one to further exaggeration and further avoidance behavior. Elsewhere 
Nietzsche says: 
Ordinary envy is wont to cackle when the envied hen has laid an egg, thereby relieving 
itself and becoming milder. But there is a yet deeper envy that in such a case becomes dead 
silent, desiring that every mouth should be sealed and always more and more angry because 
this desire is not gratified. Silent envy grows in silence.' 
By speaking to the youth Zarathustra aims at breaking this downward spiral of 
silent envy. 
The youth confirms the analysis: "I hear Zarathustra and I was just think· 
ing of him," he replies, standing up in confusion. That is, he confirms both 
Zarathustra's belief that his avoidance was the product of obsession rather than 
indifference and the principle of emotional action at a distance, for it seems to 
him that his thoughts have somehow led to Zarathustra's appearance. With so 
much established, Zarathustra's parable takes another turn. After seeking to 
calm the youth's alarm he says: 
"Now it is with men as with this tree. 
''The more it wants to rise into the heights and the light, the more determinedly do its 
roots strive earthward, downwards, into the darkness, into the depths-into evil." 
There are several forms of envy and a number of allied attitudes. Of the latter, 
the one which receives the most extensive treatment in Nietzsche's work is the 
ressentiment of the weak and ill-favored against those who are strong and well 
turned out. This is a moral stance which begins with a sense of antithetical 
values. Nietzsche calls these "good and evil" in The Genealogy of Morals to 
distinguish the attitude from the self-affirming attitude of the "good" for whom 
the "bad" is merely a secondary concept. The envy described here is not of that 
son. Rather it is one which begins by wanting to "rise into the heights and the 
light"; that is, its first movement is an aspiration toward a goal. But there is a 
funher distinction between envy and ressentiment. As a moral attitude ressenti· 
ment does, although reactively, believe itself to be good, as the lambs that 
Nietzsche imagines in The Genealogy of Morals take themselves to be the moral 
antithesis of the evil birds or prey. Envy, on the contrary, may be relatively 
devoid of rationalization and find itself forced, despite itself, into what it 
regards as evil. " 'Yes, into evil!' cried the young man. 'How is it possible you 
can uncover my soul?' " Sanre guesses that black masses and similar 
phenomena may be conscious expressions of envy against God or the good, and 
thus consciously evil. In this case the goal has been exemplified by Zarathustra. 
But even a keen and noble aspiration may be frustrated and turn toward "the 
depths-into evil." The particular form of evil here is that which is contained in 
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the young man's explicit confession: "Behold, what have I been since you ap· 
peared among us? It is envy of you which has destroyed me!" Frustrated aspira· 
tions have a way of turning against those who have exemplified success in the 
pursuit in question. 
The evil of envy is that it wishes harm to the envied one even at the ex· 
pense of the envier; it is willing to sacrifice its own good so as not to be con· 
fronted with the good of the other. The extreme case would be the murders 
cited by the sociologist Helmut Schoeck in his book on envy.1 In many cases 
the envious murderers were scarcely acquainted with their victims, in any or· 
dinary social sense of acquaintance. Here the envious one gives up his or her 
own freedom, a great good, simply for the sake of eliminating the rival or 
obstade.9 This is evil in the deepest sense, for it is not simply a choice of a 
perverse or narrow good to the exclusion of a more genuine or inclusive one, 
but the destruction or diminution of the goods in the situation without the 
achievement of any alternative goods. Now Zarathustra's darkest saying about 
such envy is his suggestion that this is a law of human life: "Now it is with men 
as with this tree."1o Taken together with the ressentiment of those who have no 
original aspirations, envy would appear to be not an occasional and unusual 
vice but the lot of almost all human beings. Now it may be possible to minimize 
certain kinds of envy in a system of political and economic justice like the one 
proposed by John Rawls, in which every such advantage of the more highly 
favored must be justified by its increasing the political and economic goods of 
the less favored members of the society. Even here there are limits, however; if 
half a society could become millionaires while the other half have their incomes 
increased by one dollar a year, it seems very likely that envy would be in· 
creased rather than diminished. In any case the causes of envy lie not only in 
the distribution of political and economic goods but in the frustration of noble 
aspirations or in an original feeling of worthlessness. Rawls suggests, without 
much empirical evidence, that the latter can itself be minimized by a just 
system of social arrangements. The former, involving such desires as those for 
athletic or romantic or scientific success, has no obvious antidote. 
Still the question remains why such a pattern of response should be con· 
sidered typical rather than a deplorable and infrequent aberration. 
Zarathustra's fullest answer to this question is in the chapter "On Redemption." 
There all revenge is said to be "the will's antipathy toward time and time's 'It 
was.' " The ontological source of revenge (Racbe), which I take to be inclusive of 
both envy and ressentiment, is our apparent impotence in regard to the brute ac· 
tuality of the past. However successful the will may be in overcoming a variety 
of obstacles the sheer givenness of the past and our inability to change it leads 
to the will's turning rancorously against some substitute (which might be itself). 
Envy and ressentiment are often and ordinarily described as "dwelling on the 
past.'' To be envious is to remain ftxated on real or imaginary slights, humilia· 
tions, or contrasts of status which have already occurred. When envy ra· 
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· liz itself as punishment it preaches that everything which passes . aw
ay 
:�::rve:sto pass away; here the application is to envy's joy in the destrucuon or 
5 oliation of the one who is envied. . p 
Let us now return to Nietzsche's text. Before he dir
ectl� confesses h1s envy 
to Zarathustra, the young man describes his expe
rience with others: 
"Since 1 wanted to rise into the heights 1 have no longer trusted myse
lf and no one trusts me 
an�::·�-�� aloft, 1 always find myself alone. No one speaks to me, the frost of solitude 
makes me tremble. · · · . th d 1 d · 
My contempt and my desire increase together; t
he higher I climb, e more 0 espiSe 
him who climbs. · · · · 1 t' 1 
H h d I am of my climbing and stumb
ling! How I scorn my VlO ent pan mg. ow asame . h 'h!K 
How I hate the man who can fly! How weary I am m the eig ts
 
In art this outburst confirms the analysis give
n of the transformation �f 
fru!rated aspiration into the hatred of success. It is a�o a reply to .. Zarathus��a s 
own self-congratulation in the immediately prece
d10g chapter . 
On
y 
Re� �ng 
and Writing" where he rejoices in his own agile clim
bing and fly10g . . 
et It so 
introduces the theme of the social pervasiveness of 
envy. The youth Is not only 
himself envious of Zarathustra but has experience
d the envy �f othe�. In the 
ld of envy the distinction between enviers and envie
d ones IS funcuonal and 
:�:tive to specific contexts and situations. He who envies another (Zarathustra 
. envied in this case) is himself envied by others, who 
themselves may. 
be en· 
�ied. When we realize that typically there is no unique �cale of a�m�en� 
along which success or failure can be measured, we
 see that 10 most �O�I� Sltua 
tions ever one may be involved in envy. That i
s, I may be envie o� my 
money, b!t envy others their good looks, their health or any nu�ber of th�� · 
An extreme case of such pervasive envy on a n�m
ber of s�ales IS. 
re�orte � 
the anthropologist Oscar Lewis, on the basis of hiS 
observauon of life 10 a Mex 
ican peasant village: 
The man who 5 eaks little, keeps his affairs to 
himself, and maintain� som� �tance be· 
h'mself an
p 
d others has less chance of creating enemies or 
of bemg cnttc1zed or en· 
tween I II k · A man does 
vied. A man does not generally discuss his plans t
o buy or �e �r ta e a tnp. :0 k a 
t customarily tell a neighbor or even a relative th
at she IS gomg to have a b� y or rna e 
no 
h' 
. I for dinner .... There is greater readmess to com· new dress or prepare somet mg spec1a . . 
. 
· th r's m•'s"ortune than to take 1·oy in his succ
ess, resulnng 10 a more 
miSerate m ano e 1' 
• 
• 
d d 
widespread sharing of bad news than good. Th
ere is an almost secre�;e a.;ntu
ad 
e
. 
towa;
h 
od fortune and boasting is at a minimum. Peo
ple . . . do not or man y �e ea �her where a good purchase or sale is to be made, how an animal can be cured, or m what 
ways a crop can be improved.'' . . 
In rimitive societies and to a certain extent in our 
own such pervasive envy. IS 
th P ht f as embodied in "the evil eye" or envious glance; many adage
s adviSe 
of
o: i�portance of shielding any good luck from the evil eye. Elsewhere 
Nietzsche says, "A true fox not only calls sour the 
grapes he canno�
'l
r
2
each, but 
also those he has reached and snatched from the
 grasp of others. And he 
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recognizes the almost unlimited forms of envy in this aphorism: "He is envious; 
let us hope that he will not have children, for he would envy them because he 
cannot be a child anymore."' J In Zarathustra's final reply to the youth he tells 
him that because he still feels himself noble the others dislike him and "bose 
Blicken senden"-"give him the evil eye." (Interestingly Hollingdale and Kauf­
mann both miss the colloquial force of this expression in their translations; both 
have Zarathustra speak of casting or sending "evil glances" which neglects the 
systematic structure of beliefs of which "the evil eye" is a symptom). 
Now we may think of societies with a pervasive belief in "the evil eye" as 
quite different from our own or at least, as Rawls supposes, different from the 
society which would be in accordance with our own deepest principles of 
justice. Two factors, however, suggest that our sense of this difference may be 
exaggerated. One is the epochal event of the death of God; the other is the 
tendency in a time of shrinking resources and lower economic growth to adopt 
a steady-state, zero-sum model of society according to which anyone's gain 
must be someone else's loss. For Nietzsche these two factors can be 
systematically interrelated through the concept of "the last man"; but let us 
look at them separately for the time being. 
Traditional religious belief may be interpreted as a device for minimizing. 
envy. In so-called primitive societies there is often an enormous hostility 
toward those who are different and a consequent fear of oneself being different 
from others. According to Rene Girard, one typical way of controlling the 
universal violence which might result from such �ensed differences is the ritual 
of scapegoating, that is of killing, devouring, or punishing a specific person (or 
animal substitute) which can be held to be significantly different· from all the 
rest of the society.14 In its classical form scapegoating takes the form of 
p�r�odically executing _the sacred being whose kingship makes him uncannily dtstmct from all of hts subjects. In a more general way the concept of a 
trans�endent God performs much the same social function. By being absolutely 
supertor to all human beings, God is that which suggests our fundamental 
brotherhood of solidarity. Such attitudes are typically reinforced by the idea of 
a divine justice before which we are all fundamentally equal. In the absence of 
such transcendent contrast, however, there are fewer obstacles to focussing on 
the many differences between us. Accordingly the death of God ·leaves men 
with only each other to look at and with a correspondingly accentuated sense of 
their differences. In his talk "Of the Higher Man," Zarathustra says "'You 
Higher Men'-thus the mob blink-'there are no Higher Men, we are all 
equal, man is but man, before God-we are all equal!' . . .  But now this God 
has died." (Z, 297) 
The belief in transcendent figures as a way of guaranteeing the equality of 
a group, and therefore of warding off envy, has many extensions. Nietzsche 
suggests that the cult of genius in the arts is a device for avoiding envy, for ex­
ample: "the cult of genius fosters our vanity, our self-love, for it is only when 
I 
l 
I 
f 
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we think of it as very far removed from us, as a miracle, that it does not wound 
us."lf It may be that the constant accessibility to the lives of actors and athletes 
through the mass media has helped to destroy their aura of separateness and 
has led to growth of envy like the one mentioned earlier in the changed 
behavior of baseball fans. 
Our own age is experiencing the tendency toward a steady-state society 
which may, despite a higher degree of affiuence, come to bear some significant 
structural analogies to the peasant village described by Lewis. To a large degree 
this tendency is certainly due to shrinking resources and burgeoning popula­
tion; but might it not also be a form of s�ciety which is likely to appeal to "the 
last man" and in which "the last man" is likely to flourish? 
"What is love? What is creation? .What is longing? What is a star?'' thus asks the last man 
and blinks. 
The earth has become small, and upon it hops the last man, who makes everthing 
small .... 
Nobody grows rich or poor anymore: both are too much of a burden . . . . 
No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: 
whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse. 
"The last man" makes everything small because he has no sense of nobility; a 
society of "last men" will aim at equalizing the condition of all and of giving 
envy a rational form. Once envy has been rationalized an_
d institutionalized �he 
one who thinks or wills differently will no longer be subJected to scapegoanng 
or ostracism. It will be obvious that he does not fit into the levelled society and 
so will voluntarily enter the madhouse. Here we might think of the somewhat 
similar picture of the carceral society developed by Michel Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish. Foucault traces the change in the practice of punishment 
from the public ritual execution or degradation (wi�h many of the �eat�res. of 
religious scapegoating) to the formation of the prtson. 
as a .
tot� msntunon 
designed to regularize and render predictable the behav10r of 1ts mmates; that 
is, to suppress all differences. Such institutions, significantly enough, are pro· 
jected in an extreme form in Jeremy Bentham's vision of the Panopticon, a 
building designed both for total surveillance of its inmates and to create among 
the inmates the feeling of being under total surveillance.16 I think we ought to 
regard Foucault's further suggestion that the Panopticon is the paradigmatic 
social institution of our society not so much as a literal claim, but rather as a 
warning similar to Zarathustra's vision of the last man. It shows us what life is 
like when one attempts to enforce Bentham's principle that each is to count for 
one and no more than one. 
In the parable from which I have been taking increasingly lengthy e.xcur· sions the youth shows some capacity to be saved from the last extremity of 
envy. After he breaks down in tears following his confession, Zarathustra 
throws his arm around him and reminds the youth that he still "longs for the 
open heights" and that his "soul thirsts for the stars." To some extent he takes 
lO GARY SHAPIRO 
pan in what Zarathustra will call, a few chapters later, radiant virtue (die scbenc­
kende Tugend). Radiant virtue is the inverse of envy; it is the virtue which cor­
responds to that vice. Whereas envy pulls into itself every cause for its own 
hostility and dwells on these to exaggeration, the person of radiant virtue "is in­
satiable in wanting to give." That person is an examplar, a tow�r of strength. In 
today's language we talk of stars (of falm, or in other pursuits that are publically 
known) and Zarathustra compares the figure of radiant vinue to the inexhausti­
ble radiance of the sun. Following this analogy the envious man is a black hole, 
a star which has collapsed upon itself. He and it become evident to us only 
through their destructive behavior. The envious man avoids contact but still acts 
at a distance by means of the evil eye. (Zarathustra says to the youth that "Bet­
t� than your words, your eye tells me all your peril.") The youth is torn be­
tween envy and radiant virtue. Zarathustra describes this conflict in terms of 
the metaphor of the prison; "you are still a prisoner who is plotting his 
freedom," he says. The youth has explained already how he is trapped in the 
prison formed by the distrust (or evil eye) of the others and his own distrust of 
himself. Even the free man of the spirit must purify himself, Zarathustra says, 
for much of the prison remains within him and his eye must become pure. I think 
that with Bentham's Panopticon and Foucault's carceral society in mind we can 
read this advice to the youth as more than a simple injunction to noble aspira­
tion. It also contains an analysis of the site of his condition- the prison-house of 
envy-and of the chief instrument and symptom of that condition-the eye, 
which can be either a radiant orb or the instrument of invidious calculation and 
comparison. 
But how can the youth, or any of us, purify his eye? At this point 
Zarathustra's advice may seem distressingly vague. The problem, he is sug­
gesting, is not so much that of escape but of a radical change in which one 
would no longer be on the lookout for the guards and other prisoners in the 
prison-house of envy. But such a change, or rather the description of what such 
a change would be like, will require the teachings of the will to power and the 
eternal recurrence which can ground and enable the metaphorical accounts of 
the virtues and vices which Zarathustra is giving in this early pan of the book. 
Perhaps the best that can be done rhetorically is to depict, as Zarathustra does 
in a final warning, the final terms in the involuted spiral on which the envious 
man is launched. The noble men who lose their highest hopes, he says, become 
slanderers of all hope. This is a pattern which has already become familiar in 
our analysis. But here it is advanced as a terrible possibility for the youth to 
whom Zarathustra speaks, not as a general but rather impersonal point about 
human nature. "Do not reject the hero in your soul!" may be somewhat 
trite- Walter Kaufmann calls it "advice for adolescents"-but it may also be the 
appropriate thing to say. 
Nietzsche sometimes praises envy, as in the essay on "Homer's Contest." 
Such praise of envy seems almost always to resolve itself into a celebration of 
r 
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the agonistic spirit, which Nietzsche contrasts with the atomized li�e of mo�ern 
men. The envy which is considered here is modern envy of the silent vanety. 
Nietzsche seems to imply that the stirrings of envy can be expressed through 
speech and action or that such expression can be restrained, with the conse­
quence that "silent envy grows in silence." In his advice "On War and 
Warriors" Zarathustra says: "I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. You 
are not great enough not to know hatred and envy. So be great enough not to 
be ashamed of them!" (Z 7 3-74) Envy is indeed one of the seven deadly sins and 
one which it is extremely difficult to admit to either oneself or to others. One 
typically denies one's own envy by complimenting the envied one or, as in the 
section we have just looked at, one keeps one's distance in the hope that the 
issue will not arise. If envy is indeed a human all too human emotion, we might 
all do better to be less ashamed that we feel it. 
1 Some philosophical discussions of envy in the modern period are Hegel's disscussion of 
"The Animal Kingdom of the Spirit" in the Pbenomeno/ngy of Spirit and Kierkegaard's The Two Ages 
(translated as The Present Age). 
2 Part One: aphorisms 157,162,361,503, 559; Part Two, I: 53,304,310,334,377, 
383; Part Two, II: 27, 29, 30, 244. Nietzsche is drawing to some extent on the writings of the 
French moralists, notably La Rochefoucauld, who also discuss envy extensively. The topic is 
treated extensively throughout Nietzsche's writing. 
3 Nietzsche makes such distinctions in Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, II (The Wanderer 
and His Shadow): 2 9. John Rawls draws the same distinctions in A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Har­
vard University Press, 19 71, p. 53 3. 
4 Rawls, p. 532. 
5 "On Radiant Virtue" (Von der scbenkenden Tugend). Metaphorical discourse is not the only 
form of poetic-philosophical language in Zarathustra. For an attempt to sort out the :arious tropes 
or figures in this work see Gary Shapiro, "The Rhetoric of Nietzsche's Zarathustra," tn Pbrlosopbtcal 
Style, Berel Lang, ed., Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1980, pp. 347-385. 
6 I have generally followed Hollingdale's translation, occasionally cited as Z. 
7 Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, I (Mixed Opiniom and Maxims) 53. 
8 Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, Michael Glenny and Betty Ross trs., 
New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970, pp. 106·110. 
9 For some prudential advice on how to avoid envy by hiding one's advantages and 
advertising one's misfortunes, see Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, I: 304, 310, 3 34. 
10 I take this to be the sense of Human, All-Too-Human, One, 503: "Envy andfea/nusy. -En· 
vy and jealousy are the pudendaScbamuik of the human soul. The �omparison m�y perhaps be car· 
ried further." That is, these attitudes not only are shameful but are 10 fact generanve; they help the 
soul to reproduce itself by instilling similar attitudes in others. 
12 GARY SHAPIRO 
11 Cited by Shoeck, pp. 50-51. For a general account of the anthropological literature on 
envy see George M. Foster, "The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior," Current An­
thropology, XIII 19 7 2, pp. 165-202. I do not mean to suggest that envy is limited to peasant 
societies or to the lower economic strata; one can find abundant evidence of it in mainly elite white 
male institutions such as the university. 
12. Human, All-To()-Human, Part Two, II: 244 ("The Fox of Foxes"). 
1 3 The Gay Science, 2 0 7. 
14 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, Patrick Gregory, Baltimore, John Hopkins Universi­
ty Press, 19 77. 
15 Human, All-Too-Human, Part One, 162. 
16 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan tr., New York, Vintage Books, 
1979. 
